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WHAT ARE ASSET DEMAND TESTS OF EXPECTED UTILITY
REALLY TESTING?*
Felix Kubler, Larry Selden and Xiao Wei
Assuming the classic contingent claim setting, a number of financial asset demand tests of Expected
Utility have been developed and implemented in experimental settings. However, the domain of
preferences of these asset demand tests differ from the mixture space of distributions assumed in the
traditional binary lottery laboratory tests of von Neumann–Morgenstern Expected Utility prefer-
ences. We derive new sets of axioms for preferences over contingent claims to be representable by an
Expected Utility function. We also indicate the additional axioms required to extend the
representation to the more general case of preferences over risky prospects.
Traditionally, researchers seeking to test whether individuals satisfy the classic Von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) axioms for Expected Utility preferences have often
based their experiments on binary choices over a mixture space of lotteries. In recent
years, a second approach has evolved which investigates whether financial assets
selected by individuals in a laboratory setting are consistent with the maximisation of
state independent Expected Utility subject to a standard budget constraint.1 An
innovative new experimental design introduced by Choi et al. (2007a) has facilitated
laboratory tests of these theoretical models. Referring to the advantages of their
approach versus binary lottery tests, Choi et al. (2007a, p. 154) argue that ‘... [our]
experimental technique allows us to confront subjects with choice problems that span
a broad range of common economic problems, both in theory and in empirical
applications, rather than ... stylised choices designed to test a particular theory’.
The asset demand tests are based on the classic Arrow–Debreu contingent claim
setup, in which it is assumed that there are a finite number of states and agents possess
preferences over state contingent consumption. In this setting one typically assumes a
fixed set of state probabilities and varying state consumption payoffs. An important
variation is to assume that each demand observation corresponds to a different pair of
probabilities and prices (Varian, 1983; Green and Srivastava, 1986; Kubler et al., 2014;
Polisson et al., 2015). Since in these contingent claim settings, an individual never
chooses between different consumption vectors associated with different state
probabilities, we wish to avoid making the overly strong assumption that agents
possess preferences over the space of all possible probability distributions. Indeed both
* Corresponding author: Felix Kubler: University of Zurich, Plattenstrasse 32 CH-8032, Zurich. Email:
fkubler@gmail.com.
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1 Non-parametric asset demand tests have been derived by Varian (1983, 1988), Green and Srivastava
(1986), Choi et al. (2007b), Kubler et al. (2014), Polisson et al. (2015), Echenique and Saito (2015) and
implemented in experimental settings by Choi et al. (2007b) and Polisson et al. (2015). Functional form asset
demand tests have been developed by Dybvig (1983) and Kubler et al. (2014).
[ 784 ]
The Economic Journal, 127 (May), 784–808.Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12481© 2017Royal Economic Society. Published by JohnWiley & Sons, 9600 Garsington
Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953, p. 630) and Aumann (1962) argue that the
completeness axiom in the lottery model is of ‘dubious validity’. Hence it is natural to
ask precisely what axioms guarantee that Expected Utility holds in the choice space
corresponding to the particular asset demand model being tested. The diverse
collection of asset demand tests differ not only in their assumptions about whether the
state probabilities are fixed or variable but also whether the probabilities are objective
or subjective and whether the NM (von Neumann–Morgenstern) index is concave or
locally convex. One key motivation for the specific sets of axioms we assume is that they
in principle allow one to utilise the different experimental tests to determine which set
is most consistent with the observed asset demands.
We consider three different choice settings. The first is associated with a single
contingent claim space with a fixed set of exogenously given probabilities. We show
that the required set of axioms for an Expected Utility representation consists of Strict
Monotonicity, Tradeoff Consistency and Local Risk Attitude Congruence.2 Following
Wakker (1989) Strict Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency ensure the existence of a
subjective Expected Utility (SEU) function where the probabilities are endogenously,
and not exogenously, given and the representation is strictly increasing, additively
separable and state independent. In order to ensure that the subjective probabilities
resulting from the first two axioms match the exogenously given probabilities, we
assume Local Risk Attitude Congruence. This axiom generalises the Risk Aversion
axiom of Werner (2005) where the latter guarantees that the NM, or Bernoulli, index is
concave which is consistent with the traditional revealed preference tests in Varian
(1983, 1988), Green and Srivastava (1986), Choi et al. (2007b) and Kubler et al. (2014).
The more general Local Risk Attitude Congruence allows the NM index to have
regions of both concavity and convexity which is consistent with the Expected Utility
revealed preference tests of Polisson et al. (2015).3 Thus, in Theorem 1, we show that
Strict Monotonicity, Tradeoff Consistency and Local Risk Attitude Congruence are
necessary and sufficient for an Expected Utility representation where the resulting NM
index is locally concave or convex. It is natural to wonder if Local Risk Attitude
Congruence has substantive empirical content. To see that in fact it does, first note that
Polisson et al. (2015, pp. 9–11) develop both a test of SEU (Subjective Expected Utility)
and a test of Expected Utility with exogenously given objective probabilities where in
each case concavity is not required. If asset demands pass the first test but fail the
second, then Local Risk Attitude Congruence must be violated and the agent’s
behaviour is consistent with SEU where the subjective and exogenously given objective
probabilities do not coincide. Similarly, if one assumes concavity of the utility function
and an individual agent’s data fails the revealed preference test for Expected Utility in
Kubler et al. (2014) but passes the revealed preference test for Subjective Expected
Utility in Echenique and Saito (2015), then one can conclude that Strict Monotonicity
and Tradeoff Consistency hold but Local Risk Attitude Congruence fails.
2 This can also be achieved with alternative axioms such as the Sure-thing Principle of Savage (Werner,
2005). Our motivation for imposing Tradeoff Consistency is that it together with the new Modified Tradeoff
Consistency axiom provide a very nice bridge between the cases where Expected Utility holds on one
contingent claim space and where it holds across multiple spaces.
3 Although Local Risk Attitude Congruence requires the NM index to be either convex or concave on an
open neighbourhood, this distinction cannot be tested on a finite data set.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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The second choice setting considered is a set of contingent claim spaces where each
space corresponds to a different set of probabilities. Without additional axioms,
although there will be an Expected Utility representation on each space, there is no
assurance that the corresponding NM indices will be the same (up to a positive
affine transformation). To guarantee that the NM indices are not probability
dependent, we introduce a Modified Tradeoff Consistency axiom, which generalises
Tradeoff Consistency to this more general choice space. Then in Theorem 2, we show
that Strict Monotonicity, Modified Tradeoff Consistency and Local Risk Attitude
Congruence are necessary and sufficient for a locally concave or convex Expected
Utility representation.
To our knowledge, the idea that NM indices could be probability dependent seems
to be new.4 (See Example 1 for a discussion of the intuition for why an individual’s
preferences might be representable by a probability dependent utility across
contingent claim spaces.) However, there exists some experimental evidence suggest-
ing that individuals may well have different risk preferences on the different
contingent claim spaces corresponding to different contingent claim probabilities.
First, it can be seen from Tables 1–3 in Choi et al. (2007b) that for preferences
exhibiting loss or disappointment aversion, the fitting parameters for these represen-
tations are significantly different for the contingent claim spaces associated with the
symmetric versus the asymmetric state probabilities. Second, Polisson et al. (2015)
implement their non-parametric revealed preference tests of Expected Utility and
other models on the same data obtained by Choi et al. (2007b), and find that the
critical cost efficiency indices and predictive success measures also vary across
symmetric and asymmetric treatments (see Figure 5 and Tables 2–4 in Polisson et al.,
2015). These papers are suggestive that the degree to which asset demands are
consistent with Expected Utility maximisation does indeed vary across different
contingent claim spaces. However, this claim is somewhat limited by the experimental
design, which only varies state probabilities across different treatments of subjects. A
more direct and explicit test of the different axioms in Theorems 1 and 2 is given by
Polisson et al. (2016), where crucially state probabilities are allowed to vary within
individual subjects. Both parametric and non-parametric procedures are applied to
these new data and evidence is provided supporting the notion that the NM index can
be probability dependent. Hence the axioms in Theorem 1 may be satisfied but not
necessarily the Modified Tradeoff Consistency axiom in Theorem 2.
The final choice setting considered is the general space of risky prospects where the
admissible set of contingent claim distributions includes those for which payoffs are
allowed to have different probabilities.5 We show in Theorem 3 that the Certainty
4 In the lottery setting, a similar phenomenon is observed, which is referred to as the ‘utility evaluation
effect’ by Machina (1983). McCord and de Neufville (1985, p.282), for example, note that
Using different assessment probabilities. . .lead to different indifference statements. . .There is no
reason to expect functions assessed with different probabilities to be identical. The systematic
differences among functions assessed with different probabilities also appears theoretically
compatible with the overvaluing of certainty.
5 The key difference between the space of risky prospects and the classic distribution space for von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) and Samuelson (1952) is that the former has a fixed number of states and
hence is not a mixture space.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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Uniqueness axiom is required to extend the Expected Utility representation from a set
of contingent claim spaces where the probabilities are fixed and choices are not
allowed across the spaces to this more general choice setting. The required Certainty
Uniqueness axiom imposes the surprisingly weak requirement that degenerate
lotteries with the same payoff on different contingent claim spaces are indifferent.
This suggests that the key axiom in extending the Expected Utility on different
contingent claim spaces with different state probabilities to the conventional space of
risky prospects where choices across contingent claim spaces are allowed is Modified
Tradeoff Consistency.
Based on these three sets of axioms, it would seem in principle possible to use
laboratory tests (as in Polisson et al., 2016) to distinguish between asset demands
(i) being consistent with maximising Expected Utility for a single contingent
claim space but not for multiple spaces and
(ii) being consistent with Expected Utility across multiple spaces.
But it should be emphasised that it is impossible to tell from just asset demands
whether the consumer’s choices are consistent with maximising Expected Utility
over a space of risky prospects and hence whether or not the Certainty Uniqueness
axiom holds. This is because asset demands are invariant to a particular class of
monotone transforms of Expected Utility function wereas choices over risky
prospects are not (see the discussion following utility (4) in the next Section).
For instance, an Expected Utility and a non-Expected Utility representation of
preferences over risky prospects can yield exactly the same asset demand functions.6
To test Certainty Uniqueness, it would seem that the demand analysis needs to be
augmented by a lottery test, such as in Kim (1996), where lotteries are compared to
different contingent claim spaces.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. In the next Section, we compare
and contrast the choice spaces and Expected Utility representations associated
with
(i) contingent claims assuming a fixed set of probabilities,
(ii) contingent claims assuming state probabilities vary as parameters and
(iii) a set of probability distributions or risky prospects corresponding to the case
where both probabilities and consumption vectors are choice variables.
Section 2 develops the axiom system for Expected Utility defined over contingent
claims, first for the case where probabilities are fixed and then for the case where they
vary. In Section 3, we identify the incremental set of axioms required to go from
Expected Utility preferences defined over a set of contingent claim spaces to Expected
Utility preferences defined over the space of distribution, where the number of states is
finite. Proofs of the results are provided in Appendices.
6 In Chambers et al. (2016), the authors state ‘our test is intimately tied to the classic von Neumann–
Morgenstern axioms of expected utility’. Because of the transformation property of demands, one should not
interpret this as suggesting that one can conduct an asset demand test of the von Neumann–Morgenstern
axioms.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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1. Different Preference Domains
Assume there are S ≥ 2 states of nature and there is a single consumption good in each
state. A typical consumption plan is an S vector ðc1; c2; . . .; cSÞ in the consumption space
defined by RSþ. We assume that probabilities are objective and known and denote the
probability of state s by ps . Let p ¼ ðp1; p2; . . .; pSÞ; where p 2 intðDS1Þ ¼
fp2 RSþþ :
PS
s¼1 ps ¼ 1g: Given this setting, we next define three different choices
spaces which we will investigate.
The first preference domain we consider corresponds to the classic Arrow–Debreu
contingent claim setup in which for a given value of p 2 intðDS1Þ a decision maker is
assumed to have complete, transitive and continuous preferences over RSþ which are
denoted p. The second preference domain arises if one assumes as in Kubler et al.
(2014) that the consumer confronts a sequence of independent contingent claim
optimisations where probabilities and prices vary. Then corresponding to a set of
probability vectors {p}, there will be a set of preference relations fpg which need not
give the same ordering over consumption vectors. The set of preference orderings is
assumed to be representable by a continuous utility function U ðcjpÞ : RSþ ! R; where
the notation U(c|p) indicates that corresponding to each p, there will be a potentially
different utility. It should be emphasised that for this set of utilities, the probability
vector p is allowed to change but only as a parameter. One can view U(c|p) as being
defined over a series of contingent claim spaces but not on their union. Therefore
although we can use U(c|p) to compare lotteries in each given contingent claim space,
it cannot be used to compare the lotteries across the different contingent claim spaces.
This is expressed geometrically in Figure 1, where two states are assumed. Each shaded
plane in the Figure corresponds to a contingent claim space with a given p1.
Preferences on the planes corresponding to p01 and p
00
1 are represented respectively by
U ðcjp0Þ and U ðcjp00Þ.
Another motivation, quite different from the one discussed in the introduction, for
investigating the axiomatisation of Expected Utility where probabilities are allowed to
change can be found in the work on speculation and the acquisition and value of
c1
c2
π′1 π′′1 π1
Fig. 1. Illustration of Contingent Claim Slices
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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information (see Rubinstein, 1975, Hirshleifer and Riley, 1979 for a classic overview
and Schlee, 2001 for more a more recent example). The papers in this literature
typically utilise the contingent claim setting and continue to assume that risk
preferences are representable by the same Expected Utility function as new
information is obtained and probabilities vary.7
The third choice space we consider is the full set of distributions corresponding to
(c, p), or the set of ‘risky prospects’. Tomake this precise, define a risky prospect as a pair
of vectors ðc; pÞ 2 RSþ  intðDS1Þ. Assume that a decision maker has continuous,
complete and transitive preferences over P ¼ RSþ  intðDS1Þ; denoted P . For any
fixed p 2 intðDS1Þ this implies preferences p are well defined. To distinguish the
representation ofP from the representation of fpg, we use thenotationU(c,p) instead
of U(c|p). The former, in contrast to the latter, has both c and p as arguments since one
can compare lotteries across different contingent claim spaces, or slices in Figure 1.
For each of the above three preference cases, we provide in the next two Sections a
set of axioms that is necessary and sufficient for preferences to be representable by an
Expected Utility function. We next illustrate the difference in the resulting Expected
Utilities using the following example8
U ðc1; c2; c3jp1; p2; p3Þ ¼ p1
X3
s¼1
ps½expðp1csÞ þ expðp2csÞ þ expðp3csÞ: (1)
Note first that if, as in the standard contingent claim case, probabilities are fixed at
p1 ¼ 0:5, p2 ¼ 0:3 and p3 ¼ 0:2 (defining a specific slice in Figure 1),9 (1) is
equivalent up to a positive affine transformation to
U ðcjpÞ ¼ 0:5½expð0:5c1Þ þ expð0:3c1Þ þ expð0:2c1Þ
0:3½expð0:5c2Þ þ expð0:3c2Þ þ expð0:2c2Þ
0:2½expð0:5c3Þ þ expð0:3c3Þ þ expð0:2c3Þ: (2)
Moreover it can be verified that
@U =@c1
@U =@cs

c1¼cs
¼ p1
ps
ðs ¼ 2; 3Þ
and the utility (2) passes the Expected Utility test in Dybvig (1983), implying that it can
be viewed as an Expected Utility when probabilities are fixed and the NM index is given
by
vðcÞ ¼ ½expð0:5cÞ þ expð0:3cÞ þ expð0:2cÞ:
However when probabilities are allowed to vary and one considers preferences on
different contingent claim spaces, the resulting contingent claim demands cannot pass
the tests discussed in Kubler et al. (2014). The reason is that when probabilities vary,
7 It is obviously the case that a careful analysis of these issues requires an explicit temporal component of
the choice problem. To simplify the analysis, a large part of the literature considers comparative
statics experiments where probabilities vary across different static problems.
8 This utility will be recognised to be a modified version of a representation discussed in Kubler et al.
(2014).
9 Obviously for the three state examples considered in this Section, the notion of ‘slices’ as in Figure 1
should be viewed as an intuitive proxy for the more complex spaces.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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the NM index associated with the utility (1) will also change. In general, the kind of
utility function in (1) takes the form
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
; (3)
where f (p, x) is a monotone transformation of x that can depend on p and the NM
index vp is allowed to depend on probabilities (see footnote 15 below). It should be
emphasised that for the utility (1), the NM index
vpðcÞ ¼ ½expðp1cÞ þ expðp2cÞ þ expðp3cÞ;
depends on p but is state independent and thus is not denoted by vs;p. The notation
f (p, ) indicates that on each contingent claim slice corresponding to each probability
vector p, one can consider a different increasing monotonic transform of the Expected
Utility
PS
s¼1 psvðcsÞ and optimal contingent claim demands will not be altered.
Next consider the utility function:
U ðc1; c2; c3jp1; p2; p3Þ ¼ p1
X3
s¼1
ps½expð0:5csÞ þ expð0:3csÞ þ expð0:2csÞ: (4)
If one ignores the p1 in front, this is a standard Expected Utility with the same NM
index on each contingent claim slice
vðcÞ ¼ ½expð0:5cÞ þ expð0:3cÞ þ expð0:2cÞ:
More generally, the utility (4) takes the form
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
; (5)
where f (p, x) is a monotone transformation of x that can depend on p but the NM
index v is independent of probability p. Since (4) is an Expected Utility on each
contingent claim slice in Figure 1 and the NM index is the same on each slice, it will
result in demands that pass the tests in Kubler et al. (2014). From observing optimal
contingent claim demands, one can never distinguish ordinal transformations in the
utility function corresponding to f (p, ). However, when considering comparisons over
lotteries, the utility function defined in (4) (and more generally (5)) cannot be viewed
as an Expected Utility function. To see this, consider the following two lotteries
L1 ¼\1; 2; 3; 0:2; 0:3; 0:5[ and L2 ¼\2; 1; 3; 0:3; 0:2; 0:5[;
where the payoffs in L1 and L2, respectively, are given by 1, 2, 3 and 2, 1, 3 and the
probabilities by 0.2, 0.3, 0.5 and 0.3, 0.2, 0.5. Clearly for any Expected Utility
maximiser, L1 and L2 will be indifferent. However for the utility function (4) since
p1 ¼ 0:2 for L1 and p1 ¼ 0:3 for L2, we have
U ðL1Þ\U ðL2Þ:
Hence from the lottery point of view, the transformation f ðp; xÞ ¼ p1x affects the
consumer’s choice, whereas it does not in a demand optimisation. Because of the
transformation, theprobabilities donot enter into theutility function linearly and (4) is not
an Expected Utility function. The probability weighting function for state i (i = 1, 2, 3) is
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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p1pi . From this perspective, this utility form can be viewed as being more analogous to a
Prospect Theory form (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) than Expected Utility.
Finally for the third choice space where preferences over lotteries (for a finite
number of states S), P , are represented by an Expected Utility function, the
representation will take the form
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
; (6)
where f is a continuous, monotone transformation independent of probabilities and
the continuous NM index v is also independent of probabilities. For instance in terms
of the examples considered above, U(c, p) can be any probability independent
monotone transform of

X3
s¼1
ps½expð0:5csÞ þ expð0:3csÞ þ expð0:2csÞ:
2. Preferences Over Contingent Claims
In this Section, we derive Expected Utility representations assuming preferences are
defined over a single or set of contingent claim spaces conditioned on state
probabilities. For the set of state probabilities intðDS1Þ, suppose that the correspond-
ing set fpg exists and is representable by U(c|p). We first give the representation
result over each contingent claim space, where p is specified. Then we investigate the
incremental axioms which are necessary and sufficient for the Expected Utility
representation for each preference relation in the set fpg to have the same NM index
v, up to a positive affine transform, on each slice. We compare and contrast axioms in
our risky setting with related axioms in the SEU (Subjective Expected Utility) setting.
2.1. Representation Over Each Contingent Claim Space
In this subsection, we first consider the standard contingent claim setting where for a
fixed p, U(c|p) takes the state independent Expected Utility form as in (3). We provide
the necessary and sufficient conditions for this to be the case.
Itwill proveconvenient to introduce the followingnatural StrictMonotonicity axiomfirst.
AXIOM 1 (STRICT MONOTONICITY). For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ; c p c0 whenever
cs  c 0s for all s 2 {1, 2, . . ., S} and c p c0 whenever cs  c 0s for all s 2 {1, 2, . . ., S} and
there exists at least one i 2 {1, 2, . . ., S} such that ci [ c 0i :
Based on the SEU literature, a natural candidate axiom for U(c|p) to be an Expected
Utility is the following version of the Tradeoff Consistency axiom introduced by
Wakker (1989).10
10 The SEU setting is considered in the seminal book of Savage (1954) and further investigated in an
extensive literature including the important papers of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and Wakker (1989).
For a more complete discussion of the SEU framework and associated axioms, see, for example, Wakker
(1989), Nau (2011) and Karni (2013).
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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AXIOM 2 (TRADEOFF CONSISTENCY). For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ, if csx 	 p c0sy;
c0sw 	 p csz and c000s0y 	 p c00s0x, then c000s0w 	 p c00s0z, where csx denotes the consumption
vector c with consumption cs in state s replaced by x and x; y; z; w 2 Rþ.
It follows from Kobberling and Wakker (2003 Theorem 5) that Axiom 2 implies the
Sure-Thing Principle
csx p c0sx , csy p c0sy
and the Thomsen-Blaschke condition when S = 2,
ðc1; c2Þ	 pðc 01; c 02Þ; ðc1; c 02Þ	 pðc 01; c 002 Þ; ðc 001 ; c 02Þ	 pðc1; c 002 Þ ) ðc 001 ; c2Þ	 pðc1; c 002 Þ:
Therefore Axiom 2 implies that the utility function is additively separable. Moreover,
Wakker (1984 Theorem 3.1) proves that Axioms 1 and 2 imply that there exists a SEU
representation
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
xsvpðcsÞ
" #
; (7)
where f and vp are continuous and x ¼ ðx1; . . .; xSÞ is the unique endogenously
determined probability vector.11 However, there is no guarantee that for each
s 2 {1, 2, . . ., S}, xs coincides with the exogenously given probability ps . Therefore, in
order to obtain the representation (3), we need another axiom. Before introducing
this axiom, we first define Local Risk Attitude Congruence.
DEFINITION 1. For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ, the agent is locally risk attitude congruent if and
only if there exists a c > 0 such that there is an openneighbourhoodB(c) in the contingent claim space
around the point c ¼ ðc; c; . . .; cÞ 2 RSþþ such that for every c0 ¼ ðc0; c0; . . .; c0Þ 2 BðcÞ,
either c0 p c0 or c0 p c0 holds for all c0 2 BðcÞ with
PS
s¼1 psc
0
s ¼ c0.
Then we can assume the following axiom.
AXIOM 3 (LOCAL RISK ATTITUDE CONGRUENCE). For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ, the agent
is locally risk attitude congruent.
The Local Risk Attitude Congruence axiom has two distinct implications for
behaviour. First, it requires that there is an open neighbourhood on which cardinal
utility is either concave or convex. This should be seen as a regularity condition. The
condition is satisfied if one assumes there is an open neighbourhood on which
cardinal utility is twice continuously differentiable.12 While it is possible that cardinal
11 It should be noted that in (7), xs is allowed to depend on p.
12 It should be noted that if differentiability is assumed, then Axiom 3 can be weakened to redefine
Local Risk Attitude Congruence as follows. For a given p 2 intðDS1Þ, there exists at least one c0 [ 0 such
that there is an open neighbourhood Bðc0Þ in the contingent claim space around the point
c0 ¼ ðc0; c0; . . .; c0Þ 2 RSþþ such that either c p c0 or c0 p c holds for all c 2 Bðc0Þ withPS
s¼1 pscs ¼ c0. Similarly, Axiom 4 can be weakened from assuming risk aversion for every c 2 RSþ to
assuming risk aversion for a given c 2 RSþ.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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utility is nowhere twice continuously differentiable, we view this part of the axiom as a
regularity assumption which has little empirical content (clearly it cannot be falsified
from any finite set of observations). Second, and importantly, the axiom requires that
in regions where the agent’s utility is concave (convex), he is actually risk-averse (or
risk-loving) with respect to the objective probabilities. This forces the objective
probabilities to agree with the subjective probabilities. To see this more explicitly,
consider the following example. Assume that the individual’s risk preferences implied
by Tradeoff Consistency are represented by
U ðcjxÞ ¼ x1 ln c1 þ x2 ln c2; (8)
where x ¼ ðx1; x2Þ is the subjective probability vector. Let p ¼ ðp1; p2Þ denote the
objective probability vector. Now assume that x 6¼ p, i.e.
x ¼ ðx1;x2Þ ¼ ð0:6; 0:4Þ and p ¼ ðp1; p2Þ ¼ ð0:5; 0:5Þ:
Choose a consumption vector ðc1; c2Þ ¼ ð1; 1Þ and consider its open neighbourhood
ðc1; c2Þ j 0:8\c1\1:2 and 0:8\c2\1:2f g:
Choose two consumption streams in this open neighbourhood ðc 01; c 02Þ ¼ ð1:1; 0:9Þ
and ðc 001 ; c 002 Þ ¼ ð0:9; 1:1Þ. Based on the objective probability p, both distributions
ðc 01; c 02; p1; p2Þ and ðc 001 ; c 002 ; p1; p2Þ are mean preserving spreads of ðc1; c2; p1; p2Þ.
Therefore, if the individual’s preferences are represented by
U ðcjpÞ ¼ p1 ln c1 þ p2 ln c2;
we always have
U ðc1; c2jpÞ[U ðc 01; c 02jpÞ and U ðc1; c2jpÞ[U ðc 001 ; c 002 jpÞ:
This can be also confirmed by the following calculations
U ðc1; c2jpÞ ¼ p1 ln 1þ p2 ln 1 ¼ 0;
U ðc 01; c 02jpÞ ¼ p1 ln 1:1þ p2 ln 0:9 
 0:005
and
U ðc 001 ; c 002 jpÞ ¼ p1 ln 0:9þ p2 ln 1:1 
 0:005:
However, since subjective probabilities and objective probabilities diverge, based on
the representation (8), the risk attitudes are not consistent in this open neighbour-
hood. Especially, we have
U ðc1; c2jxÞ ¼ x1 ln 1þ x2 ln 1 ¼ 0;
U ðc 01; c 02jxÞ ¼ x1 ln 1:1þ x2 ln 0:9 
 0:015
and
U ðc 001 ; c 002 jxÞ ¼ x1 ln 0:9þ x2 ln 1:1 
 0:025;
implying that
U ðc1; c2jxÞ\U ðc 01; c 02jxÞ and U ðc1; c2jxÞ[U ðc 001 ; c 002 jxÞ:
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As we show in Theorem 1 below Local Risk Attitude Congruence excludes all possible
subjective beliefs that do not coincide with the given objective probabilities.
It should be noted that the following Risk Aversion axiom in Werner (2002, 2005) is
a special case of Axiom 3.13
AXIOM 4 (RISK AVERSION). For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ and every given c 2 RSþ,
EpðcÞ p c;
where EpðcÞ denotes the S-vector c for which cs ¼
PS
i¼1 pi ci for each s.
Then we have the following result.
THEOREM 1. For any given p 2 intðDS1Þ;U(c|p) takes the following functional form
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
; (9)
where f (p, x) is a continuous function that can depend on p and is strictly increasing
in
PS
s¼1 psvpðcsÞ and vpðcÞ is a continuous and strictly increasing function where there
exists a c 2 Rþþ and an e(c) > 0 such that vpðcÞ is either concave or convex in the positive
open interval (c  e(c), c + e(c)), if and only if Axioms 1, 2 and 3 hold.
REMARK 1. Since we assume in Section 1 that U is strictly increasing, we can take v() and
f (p, ) to be strictly increasing.14 It should also be noted that the use of Axiom 3 in Theorem 1
implies that the indifference (hyper)surfaces of the utility U(c|p) need not be concave or convex.
In contrast, if one instead assumes Axiom 4 holds, then the NM index vp is guaranteed to be
concave and hence U(c|p) is quasiconcave. Both of these observations also apply to Theorems 2–
4 below.
13 Since we assume Tradeoff Consistency proposed by Wakker instead of the Sure-Thing Principle used
by Werner (2005), we automatically obtain the SEU representation (7) instead of the additively separable
form
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
vsðp;csÞ
" #
:
For Werner (2005), since the Sure-Thing Principle can only ensure this latter representation, to obtain a
state-independent objective Expected Utility representation globally, he needs to prove that at every point
x 2 Rþþ, vsðp; xÞ ¼ ðps=p1Þv1ðp; xÞ and hence he requires a global Risk Aversion axiom. For us, once the
form (7) is obtained, it is enough to show that at one point xs ¼ ps and hence we only need a local
axiom.
14 Note that if vp is strictly decreasing and f (p, x) is also strictly decreasing in x, U(c|p) is still a
strictly increasing function. However, this will not yield a new U(c|p) or alter demands. In the context of
solving for optimal demands in the classic contingent claim setting, the NM index vp is required to
be increasing and the assumption that U(c|p) is strictly increasing implies that f (p, x) must be
strictly increasing in x. The case where vp and f (p,x) are strictly decreasing is ignored throughout this
article.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
794 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ M A Y
It will be noted that each NM index vp is allowed to depend on probabilities.
This is consistent with the utility (1) discussed in Section 1, which takes the form
of U(c|p) in Theorem 1. Indeed it can readily be verified that (1) satisfies
Axioms 1, 2 and 3 for each given probability vector. Whereas Theorem 1
clearly allows for the possibility of probability dependent NM indices across
slices, the following example provides some economic intuition for how this might
arise.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the following representation
U ðc1; c2 j p1; p2Þ ¼ p1c
f ðp1;p2Þ
1 þ p2cf ðp1;p2Þ2
f ðp1; p2Þ ; (10)
where f ðp1; p2Þ ¼ a0jp2  p1j þ a1 and a0\ 0 and a1 are some constants. Clearly this
utility satisfies the conditions in Theorem 1 for a fixed set of objective probabilities. In this
case, the utility takes the popular CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) form. But when
ðp1; p2Þ varies, moving from one contingent claim slice to another, the NM index
vpðcÞ ¼ c f ðp1;p2Þ varies (by more than a positive affine transform) and hence preferences
across slices are not Expected Utility representable. Since a0\ 0, increasing the difference
jp2  p1j decreases exponents of c1 and c2 and hence increases the Arrow-Pratt relative risk
aversion. But can an intuitive argument be given for why an individual’s risk aversion
should increase as the difference in probabilities increases when one moves across slices? In the
contingent claim setting, since the payoff in each contingent claim state is unknown before
prices are given and one solves for optimal demands, it would seem reasonable to view the
contingent claim slice associated with the probability p = (1/8, 7/8) or (7/8, 1/8) as being
more risky than the contingent claim slice associated with the probability p = (1/2, 1/2).
The worry would be that the low (high) probability state might occur when the consumer faces
a low (high) price. That is, since the consumer does not know which contingent claim
vector will ultimately be selected, the risk is that the contingent claim that she desires most in
the optimisation might have a very low chance of occurring. Ex ante, it seems
reasonable to suppose that she would prefer each state to be equally likely. Following this
logic, an individual would have higher risk aversion on the contingent claim slice associated
with p equaling (1/8, 7/8) or (7/8, 1/8) versus on the contingent claim slice associated
with p = (1/2, 1/2). This argument would suggest that risk aversion increases with the
dispersion between the probabilities and that there is no a priori reason to distinguish between
cases like (1/8, 7/8) and (7/8, 1/8), which is consistent with f ðp1; p2Þ ¼
a0jp2  p1j þ a1.
As noted above in the discussion of the SEU representation (7) since in our setting
probabilities are given exogenously and not endogenously determined, the Strict
Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency axioms can not ensure that the endogenously
determined x matches the exogenously given p. To see this more explicitly, consider
the following two examples. The first one can be viewed as a variant of a Prospect
Theory representation and the second one can be viewed a state dependent utility.
Both examples satisfy Strict Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency.
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EXAMPLE 2. Assume that
U ðcjpÞ ¼ p21vðc1Þ þ p22vðc2Þ þ p23vðc3Þ: (11)
Note that this representation is affinely equivalent to the SEU representation15
U ðcÞ ¼
X3
s¼1
xsvðcsÞ; (12)
where
xs ¼ p
2
s
p21 þ p22 þ p23
:
Clearly the utility (11) satisfies Strict Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency and is a
SEU function. Although the utility satisfies the state independence requirement of Theorem 1,
it does not satisfy the requirement that the probabilities enter into the utility function
linearly.
EXAMPLE 3. Assume that
U ðcjpÞ ¼ p1vðc1Þ þ 2p2vðc2Þ þ 3p3vðc3Þ: (13)
Note that (13) is affinely equivalent to the state independent SEU
U ðcÞ ¼
X3
s¼1
xsvðcsÞ;
where
x1 ¼ p1p1 þ 2p2 þ 3p3 ;x2 ¼
2p2
p1 þ 2p2 þ 3p3 and x3 ¼
3p3
p1 þ 2p2 þ 3p3 (14)
and (13) satisfies Strict Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency. However in our setting, the
probability vector p is exogenous and fixed and cannot be transformed into x. To see that this
implies the utility (13) is not state independent, observe that it can be written as
U ðcjpÞ ¼
X3
s¼1
pssvðcsÞ;
where the NM index in each state is given by
vsðcsÞ ¼ svðcsÞ;
which is clearly state dependent and is inconsistent with the representation in Theorem 1. Thus,
the Strict Monotonicity and Tradeoff Consistency axioms in the SEU setting do not imply state
independence in our setting, where probabilities are exogenous.
15 Since the SEU axioms imply the existence of a v and a x, we use in (12) the notation U(c) rather than U
(c|x) to reflect the fact that x should not be viewed as a parameter that can be changed like our exogenously
given p.
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REMARK 2. Wakker and Zank (1999, Theorem 7) argue that Strict Monotonicity and
Tradeoff Consistency can guarantee the existence of an objective Expected Utility representation if
the objective probabilities are known. This would seem to contradict our discussion above. To see
why this is not the case, first note that
(i) they assume preferences are defined over risky prospects,
(ii) all risky prospects are available to be chosen,
(iii) their definition of Tradeoff Consistency is based on preferences over risky prospects and
(iv) preferences satisfy probabilistic sophistication (see the discussion of Axiom 7 below).
In this setup, they prove that the objective and subjective probabilities are always the same.
However, as can be seen very clearly in Exercise 2.3.1 in Wakker (2010), the argument hinges on
changing the probability structure of the lotteries by modifying the number of states and then using
probabilistic sophistication. But in the contingent claim setting, the number of states and the
probability of each state are fixed and neither can be changed. As a result, we use the Local
Risk Attitude Congruence Axiom 3 to ensure that the subjective and objective probabilities are the
same.
2.2. Representation Over Sequence of Contingent Claim Spaces
Suppose rather than allowing the NM index v in Theorem 1 to vary as the state
probabilities change, one wants to ensure that the set of preference relations fpg are
representable by a common Expected Utility function across contingent claim slices as
in Figure 1. As shown in (1), even if U(c|p) takes the Expected Utility form in each
contingent claim space, it may not be an Expected Utility with respect to the set of
preference relations fpg. Interestingly, this additional requirement can be achieved
by simply modifying the Tradeoff Consistency Axiom 2 to be applicable to the case of
multiple slices and multiple probability vectors.
AXIOM 5 (MODIFIED TRADEOFF CONSISTENCY). For each p 2 intðDS1Þ, assuming
csx 	 p c0sy and c0sw 	 p csz then for any p0 2 intðDS1Þ, if c000s0y 	 p0 c00s0x, we have
c000s0w 	 p0 c00s0z, where x; y; z; w 2 Rþ.
To provide some intuition for Axiom 5, assume S = 2 and consider the following
consumption pairs
c ¼ ðc1; 1Þ; c0 ¼ ðc 01; 0Þ; c00 ¼ ðc 001 ; 1Þ and c000 ¼

c 0001 ;
1
9

:
Consider two contingent claim slices corresponding to
p1 ¼ 0:5 and p01 ¼ 0:4
and the consumption values
x ¼ 1; y ¼ 4;w ¼ 16; z ¼ 9:
Axiom 5 implies that if
ð1; 1Þ	 pð4; 0Þ; ð9; 1Þ	 pð16; 0Þ and ð1; 1Þ	 p0 4; 1
9
 
; (15)
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then we must have
ð9; 1Þ	 p0 16; 1
9
 
: (16)
The chain of indifferent consumption pairs, (15) and (16), are shown, respectively, in
Figures 2(a) and (b), where we assume the Expected Utility representation
U ðcjpÞ ¼ p1 ﬃﬃﬃﬃc1p þ p2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃc2p :
Axiom 5 is clearly satisfied.16 In the SEU setting, since the probabilities are
endogenously determined, one only considers the case with a fixed probability
structure like Figure 2(a). Our contribution here is to assume Tradeoff Consistency
holds where the probability structure changes as in Figure 2(b).
Then we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 2. For all p 2 intðDS1Þ, U(c|p) takes the following functional form
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
; (17)
where f (p, x) is a continuous function that can depend on p and is strictly increasing inPS
s¼1 psvpðcsÞ and v(c) is a continuous and strictly increasing function where there exists a
c 2 Rþþ and an e(c) > 0 such that v(c) is either concave or convex in the positive open interval
(c  e(c), c + e(c)), if and only if Axioms 1, 3 and 5 hold for all p 2 intðDS1Þ.
3. Preferences Over Lotteries
In the previous Section preferences were assumed to be defined over contingent
consumption, and probabilities entered only as parameters. In this Section, we suppose
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Fig. 2. Geometry of Modified Tradeoff Consistency
Note. Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com.
16 Figure 2 is similar to Figure 4.5.1 in Kobberling and Wakker (2004).
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instead that a decision maker faces choices over different ‘risky prospects’ or lotteries,
which are defined as vectors ðc; pÞ 2 RSþ  intðDS1Þ. As described in Section 1, we
assume a continuous, complete and transitive preference ordering over P ¼ RSþ 
intðDS1Þ denoted by P . What additional axioms beyond those in Theorem 2 are
required to extend the Expected Utility representation of fpg to P? Maintaining
Axioms 1, 3 and 5, the following turns out to be necessary and sufficient.
AXIOM 6 (CERTAINTY UNIQUENESS). For any certain consumption c ¼ ðc1; c2; . . .; cSÞ;
where cs ¼ c is a constant for each state s,
ðc; pÞ	 Pðc; p0Þ 8p; p0 2 intðDS1Þ:
Certainty Uniqueness suggests that an individual’s preferences are ‘slice indepen-
dent’. He evaluates a lottery based just on its distribution function independent of the
contingent slice on which the lottery is located. In fact, this axiom is quite natural when
choosing over degenerate lotteries. For example, consider the certain consumption
vector c ¼ ðc; . . .; cÞ, where c[ 1. Assume that the Certainty Uniqueness axiom does
not hold and the preferences over a set of contingent claim slices are represented by
U ðcjpÞ ¼
XS
s¼1
ps
ﬃﬃﬃ
cs
p
 !p1
:
It can be easily verified that
U ðcjpÞ ¼ cp12 :
This implies that the certain consumption vector ðc; . . .; cÞ in the contingent claim
slice with the higher p1 is preferred to that in the contingent claim slice with the lower
p1. This seems counter intuitive since if one views the consumption vector ðc; . . .; cÞ as
a degenerate lottery, it has the same payoffs on each contingent claim slice. When
considering an optimisation problem in the contingent claim setting rather than
making binary choices over lotteries, one never compares consumption vectors across
different contingent claim slices and hence one cannot say ðc; . . .; cÞ in every
contingent claim slice is indifferent. Therefore although Certainty Uniqueness seems
indisputable in a lottery setting, it is essentially irrelevant in the contingent claim
setting. Suppose one assumes that
(i) consumption vectors on each contingent claim slice can be always viewed as
lotteries and
(ii) the individual’s preferences over consumption vectors are naturally extend-
able to preferences over lotteries.
Then Certainty Uniqueness would seem to hold automatically. In other words, if the
preferences are Expected Utility representable with the same NM index on each
contingent claim slice and Assumptions (i) and (ii) hold, then one would expect that
preferences over risky prospects would also be Expected Utility representable with the
same NM index and this is precisely what Certainty Uniqueness guarantees.
Axiom 6 can be illustrated in Figure 1, where it would correspond to an individual
being indifferent to the same c point along the 45 rays on the slices characterised by p0
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and p00. Together, Axiom 6 and the assumption that U(c|p) is strictly increasing suggest
that for any certain consumption vectors c ¼ ðc1; c2; . . .; cSÞ and c0 ¼ ðc 01; c 02; . . .; c 0SÞ
where cs ¼ c and c 0s ¼ c 0 (∀s 2 {1, 2, . . ., S}) and for any p; p0 2 intðDS1Þ,
ðc; pÞ P ðc0; p0Þ if and only if c  c 0. Therefore, U(c, p) is also strictly increasing in c.
Then we have the following theorem.
THEOREM 3. U(c, p) representing P takes the following functional form
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
; (18)
where f (x) is a continuous and strictly increasing function and v(c) is a continuous and strictly
increasing function where there exists a c 2 Rþþ and an e(c) > 0 such that v(c) is either concave
or convex in the positive open interval (c  e(c), c + e(c)), if and only if Axioms 1, 3, 5 and 6
hold for all p 2 intðDS1Þ:
REMARK 3. Comparing Theorems 2 and 3, it is clear that the only difference is the
assumption of the Certainty Uniqueness Axiom 6 for the latter. However in our opinion, this
axiom appears to be quite weak and it would be very surprising if laboratory tests revealed that
individuals systematically violated Certainty Uniqueness. Thus the significant restrictions in the
contingent claim setting derive from the Tradeoff Consistency and Modified Tradeoff Consistency
axioms. The former axiom together with Strict Monotonicity restricts the consumer’s utility to take
the Expected Utility form on subsets of the larger space of risky prospects P corresponding
contingent claim slices. The latter requires the NM index to be the same for each subset of P
corresponding to the set of slices. If this seemingly strong restriction fails to hold for all slices, then
the consumer’s choices over lotteries from different slices will fail to be representable by an Expected
Utility function with the same NM index and Theorem 3 will fail to hold as well. The fact that an
individual’s preferences might be representable by an Expected Utility function over some by not
other subsets of the general space of lotteries is not new. Albeit in a quite different context, there is
considerable laboratory analysis suggesting that individuals behave quite differently when lottery
choices include versus do not include degenerate lotteries. In his analysis of this ‘certainty effect’,
Conlisk (1989), for instance, finds that the fraction of Expected Utility violations drops from
about 50% to about 32% depending on whether the choice set includes or excludes degenerate
lotteries.
Comparing the representations (17) and (18) in Theorems 2 and 3, respectively,
Axiom 6 is necessary and sufficient for the transformation f to be independent of
p. For example, the introduction of Axiom 6 rules out (1) in Section 1 as a
possible representation of P . It should be stressed that the form of utility in
Theorem 3 is not verifiable at the demand level since whether or not the
transformation f depends on probabilities cannot be determined from the
contingent claim demand functions.
It is natural to wonder whether it is enough to use the Tradeoff Consistency Axiom 2
instead of the modified version Axiom 5 together with Axioms 1, 3 and 6 to
obtain the desired result in Theorem 3. The following example shows that this is not
the case.
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
800 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ M A Y
EXAMPLE 4. Assume that
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
¼ p1cp1=21 þ p2cp1=22 þ p3cp1=23
 1=p1
; (19)
where
vpðcsÞ ¼ cp1=2s and f ðp; xÞ ¼ x1=p1 :
If consumption in each of the states is the same, cs ¼ c, then
U ðc; pÞ ¼ p1cp1=2 þ p2cp1=2 þ p3cp1=2
 1=p1¼ ﬃﬃcp ;
which is independent of probabilities and hence Axiom 6 holds. For each fixed probability p, (19)
is clearly an Expected Utility function. Therefore, Axioms 1, 2 and 3 hold. But obviously (19)
does not take the form of (18) in Theorem 3.
Assuming Axioms 1, 2 (in place of Axiom 5) and 3 hold, is it possible to replace
Axiom 6 by another axiom which ensures that U takes the form in (18)? Before
introducing a new axiom, we define some additional notation. For any (c, p), where
p 2 intðDS1Þ, assuming (c, p) corresponds to the random variable X, the cumulative
distribution function is
FX ðzÞ ¼
XS
s¼1
psI ðcs  zÞ;
where
I ðcs  zÞ ¼ 1 ðcs  zÞ0 ðcs[ zÞ

:
AXIOM 7. For any pair of random variables X and Y corresponding, respectively, to (c, p)
and ðc0; p0Þ, where p; p0 2 intðDS1Þ, if FX ðzÞ ¼ FY ðzÞ, then
ðc; pÞ	 Pðc0; p0Þ:
The intuition for this axiom is that for any pair of lotteries defined on different
contingent claim spaces, if their respective cumulative distribution functions are the
same, then the lotteries will be indifferent. This is consistent with both the NM index v
and the transformation f being independent of p. It is clear that Axiom 7 implies
Axiom 6.
REMARK 4. Axiom 7 will be recognised to be similar to the probabilistic sophistication
property introduced by Machina and Schmeidler (1992) in an SEU setting (Grant et al., 2008).
Because this property is based on subjective probabilities, it is necessary to introduce axiomatic
structure to ensure that the endogenous probabilities satisfy probabilistic sophistication. However
in the case of Axiom 7, the probabilities are given exogenously and the axiom can be directly
assumed.
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We next show that Axiom 7 together with Axioms 1, 2 and 3 are necessary and
sufficient for P to be representable by an Expected Utility function where the NM
index does not depend on probabilities in contrast to the case of Example 4.
THEOREM 4. When S > 2, U(c, p) representing P takes the following functional
form
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
; (20)
where f (x) is a continuous and strictly increasing function and v(c) is a continuous and strictly
increasing function where there exists a c 2 Rþþ and an e(c) > 0 such that v(c) is either concave
or convex in the positive open interval (c  e(c), c + e(c)), if and only if Axioms 1, 2, 3 and 7
hold for all p 2 intðDS1Þ.
Finally, it is natural to inquire into the relationship between Theorem 4 and the
conventional Expected Utility representation result based on the Strong Indepen-
dence axiom (Samuelson, 1952; Grandmont, 1972). First let F denote the set of all
cumulative distribution functions defined on the consumption space (0, ∞). Assume
preferences are defined over F , which is a mixture space. Since F consists of all
possible distributions, it is not restricted to S states. Indeed the Strong Independence
axiom typically assumed for preferences over F holds for any mixture of lotteries
where the maximum number of states of the lotteries is S. Therefore, the only
difference between the set of risky prospects P assumed in this Section and F is that
for the former the number of the states are fixed at S and for F , there is no restriction
on the number of states.
It should be noted that preference properties such as first order stochastic
dominance relating to the shape of the indifference curves in the probability triangle
proposed by Marschak (1950) and extended by Machina (1982) fail to be distinguish-
able at the corresponding contingent claim demand level. In fact, the set of lotteries in
the probability triangle can be viewed as orthogonal to the set of lotteries in the
contingent claim spaces parameterised by p. The existence of an Expected Utility
representation for lotteries defined in the contingent claim space cannot ensure an
Expected Utility representation over lotteries corresponding to the probability triangle
and vice versa.
4. Conclusion
In this article, axiom systems are presented for an Expected Utility representation in
three different subspaces of the full distribution space. The first subspace is a single
contingent claim space. The axioms for this space are consistent with the revealed
preference tests assuming known fixed probabilities. The second subspace is a set of
contingent claim spaces. The axioms for this space are consistent with the revealed
preference tests assuming known variable probabilities. The third subspace is the space
of risky prospects with fixed number of states. Although the axiom system for this space
is not testable based on the optimal demand data ðpi ; ci ; piÞni¼1; it provides a bridge for
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connecting the contingent claim space and the lottery space. We identify the
additional axioms required to have an Expected Utility representation over risky
prospects when one has an Expected Utility representation for each contingent claim
space.
For future research, it would seem potentially interesting to extend the analysis in
this article to non-Expected Utility preferences. Indeed there have recently been
efforts to apply more general preference models such as Loss/Disappointment
Aversion, RDU (Rank-dependent Expected Utility) and Cumulative Prospect Theory to
the contingent claim demand setting (Choi et al., 2007b; Carlier and Dana, 2011). In
each of these cases, a fixed set of state probabilities is assumed. What modifications of
the preference axioms in the single contingent claim space are required when
extending the choice spaces of these non-Expected Utility models to a set of
contingent claim spaces and a set of risky prospects? In these alternative choice
domains do analogues of Local Risk Attitude Congruence, Modified Tradeoff
Consistency and Certainty Uniqueness play a role?
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1
For each p 2 intðDS1Þ, given our assumption that p is complete, transitive and continuous, it
follows from Wakker (1984, Theorem 3.1) that there exists a SEU representation
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
xsvpðcsÞ
" #
;
where f and vp are continuous if and only if Axioms 1 and 2 hold. Therefore, we only need to
show thatx = p if and only if Axiom 3 holds. The proof of necessity is almost directly fromWerner
(2002) – we include it for completeness: For a given c ¼ ðc; c; . . .; cÞ 2 RSþþ, consider the open
neighbourhood BðcÞ ¼ ðc  ðcÞ; c þ ðcÞÞS . Then for each point c0 ¼ ðc0; c0; . . .; c0Þ 2 BðcÞ,
consider the following optimisation problems
max
c02BðcÞ
f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðc 0sÞ
" #
S :T :
XS
s¼1
psc
0
s ¼ c0 (A.1)
if vp is concave and
min
c02BðcÞ
f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðc 0sÞ
" #
S :T :
XS
s¼1
psc
0
s ¼ c0
if vp is convex. If vp is concave in B(c), then it follows from Jensen’s inequality that
XS
s¼1
psvpðc 0sÞ vp
XS
s¼1
psc
0
s
 !
¼ vpðc0Þ ¼
XS
s¼1
psvpðc0Þ:
Therefore, c0 is an optimal solution to the optimisation problem (A.1), implying that c0 p c0
holds for all c0 2 BðcÞ withPSs¼1 psc 0s ¼ c0. Similarly, one can argue if vp is convex, then c0 p c0
holds for all c0 2 BðcÞ withPSs¼1 psc 0s ¼ c0. Since this conclusion holds for every c0 2 BðcÞ, Axiom
3 holds. Next prove sufficiency. If Axiom 3 holds, for a given c 2 Rþþ and each
c0 ¼ ðc0; c0; . . .; c0Þ 2 BðcÞ, we define ~eðc0Þ 2 RS by et ¼ eðc0Þ, es ¼ pteðc0Þ=ps and ek ¼ 0
for all k 6¼ t, s such that c0 þ ~eðc0Þ; c0 þ eðc0Þ; c0 þ eðc0Þ  ~eðc0Þ 2 BðcÞ, where
eðc0Þ ¼ ðeðc0Þ; eðc0Þ; . . .; eðc0ÞÞ. Since c0 p c0 þ ~eðc0Þ or c0 þ ~eðc0Þ p c0, one of the following
two inequalities holds
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xsvp½c0 þ eðc0Þ þ xt vp c0  pteðc0Þps
	 

xsvpðc0Þ þ xt vpðc0Þ (A.2)
or
xsvp½c0 þ eðc0Þ þ xt vp c0  pteðc0Þps
	 

xsvpðc0Þ þ xt vpðc0Þ:
Without loss of generality, assume that inequality (A.2) holds. Then we also have
c0 þ eðc0Þ p c0 þ eðc0Þ  ~eðc0Þ, implying that
xsvpfc0Þ þ xt vp c0 þ 1þ ptps
	 

eðc0Þ
 
xsvp½c0 þ eðc0Þ þ xt vp½c0 þ eðc0Þ: (A.3)
Adding separately the left and right hand sides of (A.2) and (A.3) and rearranging terms yields
xt vp c0 þ 1þ ptps
	 

eðc0Þ
 
þ xt vp c0  pteðc0Þps
	 

xt vpðc0Þ þ xt vp½c0 þ eðc0Þ: (A.4)
Setting
x ¼ c0 þ eðc0Þ=2; h ¼ 1þ 2 ptps
 
eðc0Þ
2
and k ¼ 1
1þ 2 pt
ps
;
(A.4) can be rewritten as
vpðx þ hÞ þ vpðx  hÞ vpðx þ khÞ þ vpðx  khÞ:
Using the above inequality repeatedly n times, one obtains
vpðx þ hÞ þ vpðx  hÞ vpðx þ knhÞ þ vpðx  knhÞ:
Since k < 1, taking the limit n ? ∞ yields
1
2
½vpðx þ hÞ þ vpðx  hÞ  vpðxÞ: (A.5)
Since vpðcÞ is continuous, following Jensen (1906), midpoint concavity is equivalent to concavity.
Therefore, (A.5) implies that vpðcÞ is concave in the open interval corresponding to B(c). Since
vpðcÞ is continuous and concave in the open interval corresponding to B(c), it is differentiable
except for at most countable points in the open interval corresponding to B(c). ThusPS
s¼1 xsvpðcsÞ is also differentiable except for at most countable points in the open interval
corresponding to B(c). It follows from the first order condition that for every point c0 in the
open interval corresponding to B(c) except at most countable points
xsv0pðc0Þ
x1v0pðc0Þ
¼ xs
x1
¼ ps
p1
ðs ¼ 2; 3; . . .; SÞ:
Since XS
s¼1
xs ¼
XS
s¼1
ps ¼ 1;
we have
xs ¼ ps ðs ¼ 1; 2; . . .; SÞ:
Therefore,
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
;
which completes the proof for sufficiency.
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Appendix B. Proof or Theorem 2
Necessity is clear. Next prove sufficiency. Taking p0 ¼ p; it follows from Theorem 1 that Axioms
1, 3 and 5 imply that
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
:
Suppose that p 6¼ p0. csx 	 p c0sy and c0sw 	 p csz imply that
vpðxÞ  vpðyÞ ¼ vpðzÞ  vpðwÞ: (B.1)
Similarly, c000s0y 	 p0 c00s0x and c000s0w 	 p0 c00s0 z imply that
vp0 ðxÞ  vp0 ðyÞ ¼ vp0 ðzÞ  vp0 ðwÞ: (B.2)
Moreover, in (B.1) and (B.2), x, y, z can be freely chosen, i.e. for any x, y, due to continuity, one
can always find a consumption stream c0sy on the same indifference (hyper)surface as csx.
Since Axiom 5 implies that for any x, y, z, if (B.1) holds, then (B.2) also holds. Therefore, vp and
vp0 must be affinely equivalent, i.e. for any p 6¼ p0 2 intðDS1Þ, we must have
vp ¼ avp0 þ b;
where a > 0 and b are some constants. Since the NM index is defined up to a positive affine
transformation, we can conclude that
U ðcjpÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
;
which completes the proof.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3
Necessity is obvious. Next we prove sufficiency. It follows from Theorem 2 that Axioms 1, 3 and 5
are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f p;
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
;
where vðcsÞ is a strictly increasing function. It follows from Axiom 6 that 8c ¼ ðc; c; . . .; cÞ 2 RSþ
and 8p; p0 2 intðDS1Þ; we have
f ½p; vðcÞ ¼ f ½p0; vðcÞ;
implying that f (, ) must be independent of probabilities.
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 4
Necessity is obvious. Next we prove sufficiency. It follows from Theorem 1 that Axioms 1, 2 and 3
are equivalent to a utility representation of the form
U ðc; pÞ ¼ g p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
:
Assuming that c1 ¼ c2 ¼ c3 ¼ . . . ¼ cS ¼ c; Axiom 7 implies that
U ðc; pÞ ¼ g ½p; vpðcÞ
© 2017 Royal Economic Society.
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is independent of probabilities and hence
gp½vpðcÞ ¼ f ðcÞ;
where f is independent of probabilities. It follows that 8c
gpðcÞ ¼ gp½vp  v1p ðcÞ ¼ f  v1p ðcÞ;
implying that
gp ¼ f  v1p :
If c1 6¼ c2 ¼ c3 ¼ . . . ¼ cS ¼ c then it follows from Axiom 7 that
U ðc; pÞ ¼ f  v1p ½ð1 p1ÞvpðcÞ þ p1vpðc1Þ
is independent of ps (s > 1), or equivalently,
@v1p ½ð1 p1ÞvpðcÞ þ p1vpðc1Þ
@ps
¼ 0 ð8s ¼ 2; 3; . . .; SÞ: (D.1)
Holding p1 fixed, consider two different profiles of probabilities p and p0 with associated NM
indices vp and vp0 . It follows from (D.1) that there exists a gðc1; cÞ such that
gðc1; cÞ ¼ v1p ½ð1 p1ÞvpðcÞ þ p1vpðc1Þ
and
gðc1; cÞ ¼ v1p0 ½ð1 p1Þvp0 ðcÞ þ p1vp0 ðc1Þ;
implying that
vp½gðc1; cÞ ¼ ð1 p1ÞvpðcÞ þ p1vpðc1Þ
and
vp0 ½gðc1; cÞ ¼ ð1 p1Þvp0 ðcÞ þ p1vp0 ðc1Þ:
Therefore,
vp½gðc1; cÞ ¼ hfvp0 ½gðc1; cÞg
¼ p1h½vp0 ðc1Þ þ ð1 p1Þh½vp0 ðcÞ
¼ h½ð1 p1Þvp0 ðcÞ þ p1vp0 ðc1Þ:
(D.2)
Since (D.2) holds for any given p1, c1 and c, we can conclude that h is a linear function which can
depend on ps and p0s (s = 2, 3, . . ., S). Since 8p; p0 2 intðDS1Þ with the same p1, there always
exists a linear function hp;p0 ðÞ such that vpðcÞ ¼ hp;p0 ½vp0 ðcÞ, we can conclude that
vpðcÞ ¼ j01ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1Þvp1ðcÞ þ j02ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1Þ ð8cÞ; (D.3)
where j01 and j
0
2 are arbitrary coefficients. Assuming c2 6¼ c1 ¼ c3 ¼ . . . ¼ cS ¼ c and following
a similar argument, we can also show that
vpðcÞ ¼ j001ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1Þvp2ðcÞ þ j002ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1Þ ð8cÞ; (D.4)
where j001 and j
00
2 are arbitrary coefficients. Combining (D.3) with (D.4) yields
vpðcÞ ¼ j1ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1ÞvðcÞ þ j2ðp1; p2; . . .; pS1Þ ð8cÞ;
where j1 and j2 are arbitrary coefficients and v is independent of probabilities. Therefore we
have
U ðc; pÞ ¼ g p;
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
¼ f  v1p
XS
s¼1
psvpðcsÞ
" #
¼ f
XS
s¼1
psvðcsÞ
" #
:
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